The Legal Community of Mankind, by Walter Schiffer by Buehrig, Edward H.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 30 | Issue 4 Article 10
Summer 1955
The Legal Community of Mankind, by Walter
Schiffer
Edward H. Buehrig
Indiana University
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the International Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Buehrig, Edward H. (1955) "The Legal Community of Mankind, by Walter Schiffer," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 30: Iss. 4, Article 10.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol30/iss4/10
BOOK REVIEW
The LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND. By Walter Schiffer. New
York: Columbia University Press, 1954. Pp. 367. $5.50.
Very little of a fundamental nature has been written about inter-
national organization. The literature, although voluminous, is for the
most part hortatory or merely descriptive. This book by Walter Schiffer
is a notable exception. An analytical critique of the League of Nations
and the closely similar United Nations, it is a major work which will
have to be taken into account by those who endeavor to form significant
judgments about these institutions. The Legal Community of Mankind
is published posthumously as Walter Schiffer died in 1949. Born and
educated in Germany and until 1933 a judge in the German judicial
administration, he was a research fellow at the Geneva Research Center
from 1937 to 1941, when he came to the United States. He completed
writing the present book while associated with the Institute for Ad-
vanced Study.
The treatment of the League-for the League rather than its suc-
cessor receives the main attention-is not in terms of its constitutional
structure. The purpose is not to submit the provisions of the Covenant
to a legal examination endeavoring to discover still different patterns of
organization and procedure in the hope that ingenuity in these respects
might be sufficient to meet the challenge of the times. This vein has
already been thoroughly mined by the authors of the United Nations
Charter, with results showing that the point of diminishing returns is
soon reached. Schiffer's book is concerned with the assumptions about
human relations underlying the League. A welcome turning to funda-
mentals, it succeeds in throwing some light on why international organi-
zation has not served in the intended way to meet the security needs of
nations.
Schiffer is not satisfied with the usual explanation that it was not
the League that failed but rather the member nations, who, failing to live'
up to their obligations, neglected to use the machinery for peace provided
by the League. This, in Schiffer's view, is begging the question. He
expresses his own judgment in the form of a paradox, "the League could
be expected to work only if the conditions did not exist which appeared
to make the existence of that organization necessary." (p. 282). The
whole object of the book is to make plain the meaning of this assertion.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Schiffer considers the League to be a product of the "progressivist"
thought of the nineteenth century, which assumed a natural harmony
in human relations, the conditions of which could be discovered by ra-
tional men and whose attainment is in actual process of realization. The
legal community of mankind was believed to rest in natural law, a law
of reason standing outside and above the government made law of states.
This conception, of course, is much older than the nineteenth century.
In fact, the history of international law, which Schiffer treats with un-
usual perception, deals largely with the assertions and counter-assertions
concerning the position of natural law in its make-up. Picking up this
strand in Western legal thought in its medieval phase, Schiffer sees in
the church a governmental institution whose object was to actualize the
natural law in human society. But the church only corrupted itself in
the attempt. And this Schiffer believes was an inescapable result be-
cause the essential moral character of the natural law cannot be directly
translated into governmental practice. Schiffer is not cynical. He does
not reject the quest for justice. He believes, however, in a division of
labor between the moral philosopher and the politician. The ideals of
the former, while they greatly influence the politician, are after all never
wholly achievable and, insofar as they are approximated, must be ap-
proached by political means. And politics is a game, sometimes a
dangerous one, of power, which, within our domestic communities, gov-
ernment and the mundane laws of government keep within tolerable
limits.
The progressivists were persuaded that growing rationality and
morality were gradually but surely leading to the realization of harmony
in international affairs. This result would be finally achieved when
certain conditions had been met: (1) the general acceptance of the
democratic form of government, (2) the attainment of self-determina-
tion, and (3) the firm establishment of an unfettered international
economy. Progress was the cardinal tenant of the progressivist creed,
and these conditions, it was believed, accorded with the historical trend.
When society at length had been freed of the arbitrary hindrances of the
past, the natural harmony of interests would emerge. Then, public
opinion, based on the thought and conscience of the emancipated indi-
vidual, would constitute the governing force of the world.
Such, the author contends, was the rationale underlying the League.
But, if this was a sound view of human relations and a reasonable ex-
pectation for the future, why, Schiffer asks, did the progressivists neg-
lect to expose national government as an unnecessary evil? And, if
government at the international level was superfluous, why should even
BOOK REVIEWS
the League be regarded as serving any essential purpose? The very
establishment of the League attested to the inadequacy of the progres-
sivist assumptions about human relations, but the League was a weak
and contradictory response to the challenge of international politics. It
was an attempt "to deal with the problems arising from political diver-
gencies between the states into which the world was divided, by methods
the successful functioning of which presupposed an essential unity of
purpose among the peoples of the world, and therefore the absence of
political discord." (p. 283).
Since politics cannot be divested of its mundane qualities, the pro-
gressive thinker who saw future international relations divested of the
importunities of politics was under the illusion that
• . . peace and order could be guaranteed without any im-
portant change of existing conditions. The thinker who held
this opinion expected that the increased reasonableness of man-
kind would guarantee the success of world organization. Since
generally he regarded himself as reasonable enough, he hoped
that the others would rise to his level of wisdom. His reason-
ableness was based on his satisfaction with his and his particu-
lar community's general situation; he, therefore, hoped that the
others eventually would share his viewpoint and that then he
would be able to enjoy peace and security under the same condi-
tions which had prevailed before the organization was estab-
lished. In order to bring about the ideal situation, it seemed
sufficient by teaching and preaching to convince the others of
the advantages which they would derive from its realization.
It appeared possible, therefore, to avoid the material and moral
risks which ordinarily result from the necessity of reaching
political decisions and engaging in political activity designed to
bring about concrete improvements of political and social condi-
tions. Thus, it may be said that the idea that everything could
be obtained for nothing was an important element of the pat-
tern of thought which shaped the League of Nations and the
United Nations idea. (p. 301).
Schiffer has caught in this passage-the concluding one of the book-a
characteristic feature of the nineteenth century outlook of the Western
democracies. That much of it survived the first World War and was
reflected in the League of Nations cannot be denied.
Much of Schiffer's argument looks in the direction of a world state,
and the concluding chapter, a brilliant essay on international politics, is
partly devoted to that subject. His main point is that a world state can-
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not, any more than the League or the United Nations, escape the fact
that the maintenance of peace is essentially a political problem involving
clashes of interest and the difficult adjustments which are inescapable
if violence is to be avoided. The constitutional framework within
which the process takes place is one factor making for war or peace.
Schiffer certainly feels that, theoretically at least, a world government is
more promising of results than an organization of independent states.
But he is keenly aware of the vast difficulties which would be encoun-
tered by any attempt to create a universal state. Could such a goal be
reached, he asks, without involving mankind in a general struggle in
which it may be exposed to the use of the same destructive weapons
which seem to make the preservation of peace imperative? Moreover,
if a world state were successfully created by the liberal-democratic peoples
in the world, how long could it preserve its distinct character under the
strain of ruling the masses of other peoples outside the Western tradi-
tion? But, quite independently of the question as to the effect of any
particular type of constitutional arrangement on the international politi-
cal process, Schiffer always returns to his point of main emphasis-that
finally it is the concrete social, economic, or power adjustment which
makes the difference between war and peace.
In consideration of the improbability of achieving an acceptable and
efficacious world state, it is suggested that we look at the existing pat-
tern of world organization from a different point of view than that of
Schiffer. Even though we agree with him in holding naive the pro-
gressivist philosophy which gave birth to the League and the United
Nations, can we, after making allowance for the exaggerated expecta-
tions of a new era of cooperation and security radically unlike the old,
justifiably conclude that the League and United Nations are quite irrele-
vant to the times? A less exalted view of these institutions might see
them as a continuation and elaboration of the already established diplo-
matic pattern of international politics. As such, they may stir neither the
adulation nor the hostility which in their other guise they have so fre-
quently evoked, but still they may not lack utility. Schiffer, concerned
with philosophical origins, does not explore this question. Yet he gives
a main clue to its answer when he says in passing that he is not suggest-
ing that the United Nations can have no importance. On the contrary,
"it would be quite possible for a member state or a group of member
states to use that organization for their particular political purposes,
which might include the maintenance of the peace of the world. But
such a political use of the organization obviously would not correspond
to its ideal purpose." (p. 291). This, of course, is precisely what has
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happened. An adequate estimate of the United Nations, therefore,
would require an examination of the use being made of it by the free
world, and particularly the United States, in the East-West conflict.
Is it, for example, being turned to better advantage in the struggle of
the established democracies against the Soviet Union than the League
was against the demands of fascist Germany and Italy? Admittedly, to
view the United Nations as a coalition is strangely incongruous when
one considers the original assumption of a legal community of mankind
based, not on the authority of government, but on faith in the ascendancy
of rationality and morality. But it is not at all uncommon for political
institutions to take on a form and character different from that en-
visioned by its founders.
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